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INTRODUCTION
BY THE HONORABLE PATRICIA SCHROEDER*

Just over one minute into flight, the space shuttle "Challenger" exploded into a raging fireball killing all seven crew members on January
28, 1986. The ensuing investigations, both the one conducted by the
President's Commission, chaired by former Secretary of State William
Rogers, and the ones conducted by the press, made it clear that the solid
rocket booster had severe preexisting problems that were exaggerated by
the subfreezing temperatures at Cape Canaveral on the morning of the
fatal launch. Moreover, engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and at the booster manufacturer, Morton Thiokol, had expressed concerns about the launch--concerns which never got
to the attention of those who made the final decision to launch.
NASA, through the sixties and seventies, had been a model of enlightened management. Employees at all levels were encouraged to
speak up and propose solutions to technical problems. A rather low level
engineer came up with the umbrella idea which saved the Sky Lab project. Yet, even in an organization with a strong history of open communication, time, size, bureaucratic turf, external pressures, and cowardice
ensured that key information did not get to those who could avert
disaster.
Congress voted to protect whistleblowers to facilitate communication of key information to those who can avert disaster. The disaster can
take the form of theft of public funds, contract overcharging, or inadequate inspection of meat. It is a disaster when a public official is indicted
for graft; it is a disaster when inadequate embassy security allows a terrorist to plant a bomb; it is a disaster when tainted drugs make it to the
market. And it is surely a disaster when a NASA spacecraft explodes.
In some cases, the agency head would step in and avert the disaster
if only he or she found out in time. In other cases, the agency head is
part of the criminal conspiracy. Yet, even in the latter case, there is
someone higher who can head off the problem: The President, the Congress, the taxpayers. That is why we do not limit protection to employees who disclose information within their own agencies. Disclosure to
the Congress, to interest groups, and to the press also needs to be protected and encourage.
The whistleblower protection law was passed as a taxpayer protec* (D-Colorado); Chairwoman of the Subcommitte on Civil Service, Committe on Post Office
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tion law. It was passed in a rather unusual place. In 1978, the Carter
Administration proposed the Civil Service Reform Act which was aimed
at fostering stronger management control of the federal workforce. I added whistleblower protection and disclosure investigation provisions
when the bill was in the House.
The Civil Service Reform Act as passed gives agency managersboth career and political-tools to reward performance and to punish
less productive employees. The Senior Executive Service, merit pay, and
the performance appraisal system were all designed to make the civil service more responsive to top down management structure, in which direction flows down and information flows up following clear chains of
command.
The Federal government has been remarkably slow in moving towards participatory management. Even such moderate ideas as worker
participation and quality circles have been slow to develop in the civil
service. The system is clearly hierarchical and the Civil Service Reform
Act was intended to strengthen, not alter, the hierarchical controls.
So, whistleblower protection runs cross current to the central goal of
the Civil Service Reform Act. Employees are supposed to follow normal
channels in making their concerns known. Yet, whistleblower protection, together with the creation of agency Inspectors General, also in
1978, told employees to skip the chain of command when they learn
about violations of law, fraud, waste, mismanagement, or dangers to public health and safety.
To enforce the whistleblower protections, Congress created an Office of Special Counsel. Everyone knew that this was going to be a tough
job. The Special Counsel had to receive numerous employee complaints
and weed out those which do not allege violations of laws which the
Special Counsel has power to enforce. When the Special Counsel finds a
good case, he or she is forced to intervene in agency management and tell
managers--often political appointees-that they cannot run their agencies the way in which they want to do so. Frequently, the Special Counsel has to get in the way of strong management actions to protect the
rights of employees.
The difficulty of the job is shown by the fact that not one of the four
individuals who has served as Special Counsel has been successful. The
first two, who served under the Carter Administration, lost virtually all
the cases they brought. The two appointed by President Reagan somehow were unaware of the employee protection nature of the job. One,
Alex Kozinski, used his position as Special Counsel as a springboard to
become a Federal Court of Appeals judge. The other, K. William
O'Connor, thought that he was a prosecutor, out to punish the bad guys.
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He considered victims of prohibited personnel practices to be mere
witnesses.
Is the problem with whistleblower protection legal or human? I
rather suspect the latter. I believe a dedicated and aggressive person
could operate to protect whistleblowers and could use the prestige of the
office to encourage disclosures. Congressional intent could be achieved
by a good appointee. Recently history, however, tells us that we cannot
count on good appointments.
Moreover, the reputation of the Office of Special Counsel has fallen
so low that it may be very difficult for the most spectacular appointee to
have the sort of clout he or she needs to secure any voluntary cooperation from agency managers for years. Without some voluntary compliance, the job of protecting all whistleblowers would be impossible.
For this reason, I have decided it is time to amend the law. In
January, I along with dozens of my colleagues, introduced H.R. 4033,
the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1986. The basic concept of this legislation is that whistleblowers should have an alternative route to get
their cases heard. Instead of having to go through the Special Counsel,
and having no appeal of a negative determination of the Special Counsel,
the whistleblower can go directly to the Merit Systems Protection Board.
We provide the employee with a choice: either go to Special Counsel and
get a free lawyer and investigation or go directly to the Board and bring
your own case.
The legislation would also eliminate some of the legal barnacles
which have become attached to this program. The bill uses the "reasonable evidence" standard instead of the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard for proving whistleblower reprisals. The bill provides better
discovery rights than current law.
I expect to bring this legislation to the House over the summer. Its
passage will ensure that another bad Special Counsel cannot totally cripple whistleblower protection.
The Challenger disaster taught us a number of lessons. It taught us
the value of encouraging and listening to dissent. It also taught us that
employees of government contractors need protection too. Engineers at
Morton Thiokol tried to warn NASA management of problems with the
solid rocket boosters. When they told the Presidential Commission of
their warnings, they were disciplined by Morton Thiokol. These people
should be protected as well.
All these employees should be protected because these employees
are performing an important public function. They are letting managers
of public programs know of problems before these problems get out of
hand. Managers should welcome, not tried to squelch, this information.

